

**Anticipating Failed States in Latin America - Implications for  
SOUTHCOM Strategy**

A Monograph  
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## ABSTRACT

ANTICIPATING FAILED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA - IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTHCOM STRATEGY by MAJ Linwood Ham, Jr., USA, 52 pages.

With the exception of Cuba, US-Latin American relations do not have the specter of Communist influence in the hemisphere distorting the thrust of foreign policy. What does remain is the threat of crises that endangers the viability of the fledgling democracies throughout the continent. The US National Security Strategy of 1999 lists transnational issues such as narcotics trafficking, corruption, illegal immigration, organized crime, terrorism, and adherence to the rule of law as the primary security concerns in the region. These issues threaten the economic vitality of the region, which is vital to maintaining the momentum of democratization.

This monograph defines the model of intra-state conflict as described by historian and social scientist Crane Brinton. His book, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, provides a useful framework to understand the nature of intra-state conflict. After describing Brinton's work, this monograph introduces the concept of the failed state, which affords Brinton's model fundamental differences in the initial stages of intra-state conflict. Finally, this monograph introduces the concept of Latin American authoritarian rule as manifested through the military strongman. These concepts spawn new actors that impact on the viability of the state and the well-being of the people

The monograph then explores two contemporary case studies to determine how these theories are made manifest in Latin America. Panama faces the challenge of strengthening state institutions after years of military rule, while assuming full Canal operations, combating drug trafficking, and responding to incursions by Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary forces along its eastern border. Venezuela has been among the top three exporters of oil to the United States in the last ten years. The 1998 election of President Hugo Chávez, a former army lieutenant colonel and coup leader in 1992, brings the threat of a political crisis as he retools the constitution and state institutions with an authoritative efficiency that has marginalized the established political elite.

The monograph continues with an analysis of the SOUTHCOP Theater Engagement Plan to determine the extent the plan is informed by the application of a conceptual framework that exposes the current political, social, economic, and military settings in Latin America as they relate to the security challenges that exist in the region.

The monograph concludes that application of theory is essential in contemplating the strategic setting in countries like Venezuela and Panama. Just as important, the U.S. military must gain the support of the interagency in order to facilitate better planning and execution of TEP. Failure to bring to bear all the instruments of national power means SOUTHCOP may face the possibility of intra-state conflict ushering in a new round of military interventions and military rule in Latin America.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

Our hemisphere enters the twenty-first century with an unprecedented opportunity to secure a future of stability and prosperity - building on the fact that every nation in the hemisphere except Cuba is democratic and committed to free market economies... Equally important, the people of the Americas have reaffirmed their commitment to combat together the difficult threats posed by drug trafficking and corruption. The United States seeks to secure the benefits of this new climate in the hemisphere, while safeguarding our citizens against these threats.<sup>1</sup>

The history of United States involvement in the affairs of Latin American countries began with the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, which decreed that the US would no longer stand for additional European colonization. Over time, American presidents expanded this understanding to mean the United States was the only power authorized to intervene in Latin American countries, and did so through diplomacy, economic incentives and disincentives, and military force. Operation JUST CAUSE in 1989 and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in 1994 are the latest examples in US interventions designed to bring order to countries that lost its ability to govern effectively. Domestic pressures as well as long-standing disapproval by Latin American countries of US interventionist policies in the region has required a rethinking of strategy.

The end of the Cold War in 1989 has ushered in a new era in relations between the United States and Latin America. With the exception of Cuba, US-Latin American relations do not have the specter of Communist influence in the hemisphere distorting the thrust of foreign policy. What does remain is the threat of crises that endangers the

viability of the fledgling democracies throughout the continent. The United States is committed to cooperative engagement with Latin American countries to ensure that democracy continues to take root and flourish in the region. The US National Security Strategy of 1999 lists transnational issues such as narcotics trafficking, corruption, illegal immigration, organized crime, terrorism, and adherence to the rule of law as the primary security concerns in the region. These issues threaten the economic vitality of the region, which is vital to maintaining the momentum of democratization. It becomes the mission of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to work with Latin Americans to devise ways to address these security concerns to avert further military interventions in the region.

SOUTHCOM has the mission to translate the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy into a comprehensive Theater Strategy that implements plans to accomplish US strategic aims. Their challenge is to devise a sound Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) that employs military troops, resources, expertise and experience to allow Latin American countries to address the issues that could affect the pace and trajectory of democratization before it becomes a crisis that requires military intervention to prevent internal chaos. Fundamental in the development of SOUTHCOM TEP is an understanding of the nature of conflict as it relates to Latin America, as well as an understanding of the current political, social, economic, and military settings as they relate to the security challenges that exist in the region.

Latin American militaries remain a critical component in addressing hemispheric issues. The military has a long history of involvement in the political, economic, and social direction of the state. Latin American countries suffered their worst bout of

military involvement in state affairs from 1964 to 1989, when the region witnessed civil wars, military rule or the threat of a military coup at the first sign of internal trouble. The 1990s reintroduced civilian rule in the region, and Latin American countries are now relearning democratic processes and rebuilding political institutions so the civilian leadership retains the power of governance. A key task for SOUTHCOM is to promote military institutions that support this process. Direct engagement of Latin American militaries is critical if the continent is to enjoy the fruits of democracy and economic prosperity.

This monograph employs the theoretical framework for revolution as outlined by Crane Brinton in *The Anatomy of Revolution*, modified by theories of failed states and Latin American military strategic concepts and doctrine, in order to establish a way to assess the strategic setting in the region. The critical aspect of this framework is the identification of the antecedents of intrastate conflict. The monograph then introduces the case studies of Panama and Venezuela to determine not only their specific strategic setting, but also the antecedents for conflict that may form or currently exist. Finally the author analyzes SOUTHCOM Theater Strategy and TEP for each country to determine how it addresses those all-important antecedents to conflict. The standards the author will use to evaluate SOUTHCOM strategy and TEP are:

- Does SOUTHCOM utilize a conceptual framework that articulates the essence of intrastate conflict in Latin America in the formulation of theater strategy and TEPs?
- Do TEPs address the issues that affect each individual country?

- Do TEPs provide the necessary tools to prevent impending crises from exceeding the capability of the country to address?

Two countries offer prime opportunities to employ conflict forecasting in order to devise effective TEPs that address each country. Panama began its first year without the presence of the US military on December 31, 1999 with the signing over of the Panama Canal and the removal of the last US military forces in the country. Although the US is no longer present in Panama, it remains committed to protecting the Canal to ensure the safe passage of shipping for all users. Panama's challenges are daunting. It must continue to strengthen its state institutions after years of military rule, while keeping the Canal free from domestic political intrigue and external threats. The country also faces the dual threat of increased drug trafficking and money laundering through the country and the incursions of Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary forces along its southern border.

Venezuela has been among the top three exporters of oil to the United States in the last ten years, and has been a long-standing partner with the US to thwart the transshipment of drugs through Venezuela. The 1998 election of President Hugo Chavez, a former army lieutenant colonel and coup leader in 1992, brings the threat of a constitutional crisis as he retools the constitution and state institutions with an authoritative efficiency that has riled the established political elite. This tension is exacerbated by the mudslide disaster that devastated the northern coast in December 1999 and the constant incursions of Colombian drugs, refugees, and guerrillas along Venezuela's western border.

These two countries are important to US domestic interests and interests in the region. It is essential that these countries do not fall victim to regional security threats. Additionally, state institutions must operate to withstand these threats while maintaining the momentum towards becoming more democratic and economically stable. Otherwise we may face the possibility of intrastate conflict ushering in a new round of military interventions and military rule.

Theater Engagement Plans are a fairly recent requirement for regional CINCs. In an era when United States military power resides mainly in the continental United States, it becomes very important to maintain visibility in the region and deploy minimal combat power to prevent a crisis situation from devolving into a violent conflict. The TEP is CINCSOUTH's primary means to accomplishing his strategic goals. The plan must be relevant to the unique strategic situation in the region, and in each country. It is imperative that SOUTHCOM planners employ a concept to explore the possibility of intrastate conflict erupting in the region. As the country's economy of force region, SOUTHCOM must create a dynamic TEP that thwarts an impending conflict before it becomes an inevitability.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THEORIES OF INTRASTATE CONFLICT

Western hemisphere colonists north and south fought and won an independence bid against their stronger colonial benefactors in Europe. Why has the development of Latin American nation-states differed so much from the ascendancy of the United States from fledgling revolutionary to the dominant superpower in the twenty-first century? Both had land and natural resources at their disposal. Both had visionaries who sought a greater good in the amalgamation of colonies into a new nation. To answer this question requires an understanding of the intrastate tensions that existed in Latin America after independence, and still vex state institutions in Latin America today.

Historian and social scientist Crane Brinton wrote the revised and expanded version of his 1938 work, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, which today provides a useful framework for understanding the components of intrastate conflict as they manifested in Latin America. Brinton charted a path of revolutionary struggle by describing the changes that are revealed in the human body as a result of a fever. He identified five transition states that exist during a revolution: Prodromal, or the period of evolving preconditions, Full Symptoms, when the conditions are set for violent conflict, the Reigns of Terror and Virtue, when the revolutionaries seek to install their utopic ideals, Thermidor, when the government and society begins to return to normalcy, and Recovery, when the state rises renewed and strengthened with a more efficient government. The country has added the revolutionary experience to its national mythology; but society as a whole remains unchanged.<sup>2</sup>

While Latin America has seen its share of political violence, only a few examples manifested into a complete revolution as described in Brinton's framework. Only Mexico in 1910, Bolivia in 1952, Cuba in 1959, and Nicaragua in 1979 endured the full spectrum of revolutionary conflict as previously described. The rest of Latin America did not escape the tensions of political violence, but those intrastate conflicts developed in very different ways. In order to understand political violence in Latin America outside of the aforementioned revolutions, Brinton's framework must be modified.

Contemporary theories of intrastate conflict address the concept of "failed state". This phenomenon appears as a result of a revolution that has become too successful, resulting in the severe weakening or destruction of the very institutions being contested. Also, the failed state could occur as a result of pre-existing chronic weaknesses in state institutions. The legacy of colonialism in newly-formed states may also pose obstacles to the formation or inheritance of sound state institutions. The new leadership may be more inclined to reap the benefits of political power for itself and its support group instead of providing for and protecting the greater society. The removal of the colonial patron means the new state has to generate and manage its own finances; the failure of establishing a comprehensive economy would also severely weaken the state from the start.<sup>3</sup> These conditions present a new set of preconditions that thwart efforts to establish a set of ideals that would animate a political struggle to improve the state. Instead violence, or the threat of violence, becomes the means to transfer and maintain political power. This change in Brinton's model spells disaster for the improvement of the state bureaucracy. The violence it will endure will likely contribute to sustained or increased governmental inefficiency, which Brinton highlighted as a key precondition for violence.

The Wars of Independence between Latin America and Spain in 1811 provides the setting to understand the breakdown of the revolutionary logic as described by Brinton. This review will also introduce the notion that future struggles for political control would follow a different path than Brinton's framework. Soon after the overthrow of Spanish rule in Latin America, the rise of the military strongman would become a continuing legacy and an influential factor in the course of political struggle in the region.

The Wars of Independence resulted from opportunity, but was borne from deep seated issues between the Spanish crown and the American elite. Spain strictly controlled the trade in colonial Latin America, ensuring the majority of the wealth returned to the crown. Those that generally profited from this relationship were those born in Spain and worked in America as merchants (*peninsulares*). Those that were born in the Americas were often landowners and local administrators (*criollos*) who felt their ability to increase their wealth was threatened by the Spanish Crown's monopoly on trade and by the merchants that supported the Crown's efforts<sup>4</sup>. The invasion of Spain by France in 1808 severed the links between the Spanish Crown and the Viceroyalties in the Americas. This allowed the internal struggle between the *criollos* and the *peninsulares* to progress to violent conflict.<sup>5</sup>

The leaders of the Wars of Independence rose from the rift between the two factions. The ideals of Simón Bolívar animated the spirit of Latin American revolution. He not only lead the revolt to rid the Americas from the Spanish Crown, but also to lead to a better means of governance for the Americas. Simón Bolívar is considered "The Liberator" of Andean South America. He is the most influential and enduring revolutionary figure from the wars of Independence for his visions of a great republic

poised to grow in regional and international power. From the earliest days of the revolution, Bolívar beseeched the regional leaders to band together as “a confederation against foreign tyranny.”<sup>6</sup> His philosophies of a new government in Latin America were highlighted in his “Letter from Jamaica”, which spoke eloquently of the oppression system of monarchy, the great potential of a new political reality in Latin America, and of his desire to fight to the end to achieve this new reality.<sup>7</sup> Bolívar recognized the inherent weakness of a group of small regional territories calling themselves states; he called for republican rule to protect the region from an easy reconquest in the short term, with a vision of a strong continent that could hold its own in the international community.<sup>8</sup> These ideals would be short lived as a stronger logic of governance toppled Bolívar’s vision of New Granada.

The inability of Latin America to form grand nation-states that connected the vast territories of the former viceroyalties of Spain was just as much a result of the inclination of Bolívar to rule by force as it was from intrigue by local rebel leaders. Although Bolívar fought to rid his new countrymen of Spanish oppression, the cause did not restrict him from imposing his own brand of tyranny in the name of freedom. He called for the Spanish Royalist forces to suffer the same wrath that they have brought down on the people in New Granada, and for those not working for the cause of liberty to be branded traitors and be shot.<sup>9</sup> Bolívar did not have the capacity to command forces in each theater against the Spanish, so this decree became a pretext for atrocities and retribution during the struggle. Regional commanders and local guerrilla leaders prosecuted a bloody and vicious campaign. These leaders promised their soldiers a share in booty as well as increased social stature; armies became little more than gangs of armed thugs that

attacked, raped and murdered in the name of freedom.<sup>10</sup> This reality over the course of the Wars would breed a kind of armed force that was beholden not to a national ideal per se, but to the whim of the strongman.

Despite Bolívar's calls for an end to monarchy rule and freedom for a confederated Americas, he failed to unite regional powers in fulfilling his vision. Detractors such as General Ducoudray Holstein blamed Bolívar for not providing the leadership necessary for this vast republic to begin the formation of nationhood after the Wars. Holstein saw Bolívar as "far from being competent to lay a foundation for good laws, schools, useful institutions, and a flourishing commerce."<sup>11</sup> While this assertion may have been informed more by jealousy than objectivity, Bolívar in fact never realized his dream of grand republic. Bolívar failed to unify the region under one rule as a result of political intrigue by local leaders. These regional despots had control of the populace, the monopoly of arms, and the support of the regional elite and merchant community. These men held sufficient power to effectively deny Bolívar's calls for unity, forcing him into exile. His farewell address in December 1830 reiterated his vision of a unified nation, and challenged the people to continue to work rid themselves of anarchy and for the military to take up arms to "defend the guarantees of organized society."<sup>12</sup> With that, the last revolutionary exited the political scene and Latin America entered the age of strongman rule.

The newly independent Latin America was left to the devices of those that helped oust Spain from the continent. Unlike the thirteen colonies of the newly formed United States of America, the regions of the southern continent could not keep the sinews of confederation intact. The newly freed Americas benefited to an extent by not having a

distant intermediary that served only to tax the populace and over-regulate commerce.<sup>13</sup>

The fledgling governments did not change much from the colonial departments, however. Latin America separated into the entities that, essentially, are the modern day countries of the continent. The militaries of each new country developed a reason for being based upon three roles: providing stability within a chaotic political structure, imposing social order in the country, and underwriting efforts to bring about economic prosperity.<sup>14</sup> These form the historical antecedents that help to explain the particular role of Latin American militaries throughout time, and the lingering menace they present in the future.

The era of the strongman ruler (*caudillo*) began during the Wars of Independence as a result of the power, wealth, and influence gained not only by the upper-class rebel leadership, but also those that served and became heroes as a result of their exploits. This new class of leaders used their military might, sustained by the continued lure of spoils for the troops beholden to their strongman, to gain social status and economic wealth that was otherwise unattainable.<sup>15</sup> Politics became a series of informal agreements between regional strongmen to support one of their own to head the government, provided that he did not interrupt regional efforts to maintain control over society and the economy. In effect, *caudillo* rule supplanted the Spanish in affecting a regime of economic extraction and social repression. This phenomenon essentially institutionalized bureaucratic inefficiency to the favor of the strongman and his followers. The military at that time served the whim of the strongman, contributing to governmental inefficiency. Over time the primacy of military force in Latin American society developed a logic for its existence and procedures called “the nation” (*la patria*) that still persists.<sup>16</sup>

The existence of the military in political life is a result of many factors. The military earned a legacy as arbiter of civilian disputes, and replaced civilian rule if political disputes threatened to bring disorder and social polarization to *la patria*.<sup>17</sup> The military alone existed as the governmental institution capable of keeping the state viable. The viability of the state was not tied to Boliviarian ideals of liberty for and unity of the nation, but instead to the regional interests of the *caudillos*. Over time, the strongmen viewed politics itself as an impediment to order and stability in their countries. Instead of allowing political opponents to resolve their conflicts, strongmen stepped in lest the system of favors be disrupted by a change in government. Latin American military leaders embraced the concept of “anti-politics”, a belief that the path to success for the state required adherence to order, obedience, authority, and stability.<sup>18</sup> This put the military on a collision course with any sector of civil society that either did not adhere to its vision of achieving this Utopia, or threatened to promote change that would challenge the dominant position of the military in society.

The objectives of strongman rule evolved from one of purely personal gain and gain for his junta, to one of national modernity. Many factors stood in the way of progress in Latin America. The region remained desperately poor throughout the nineteenth century, being left behind by North America in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. This precipitated the decline of the violent struggle for power between rival *caudillos*. Latin American countries required effective national leadership to chart national economic policy, and could no longer exist effectively under the capricious rule of the strongman.<sup>19</sup> This did not usher out the military from political life, just refined the concept of anti-

politics. New challenges awaited the military as it faced the strains of the global economy, the Cold War, and the treat of insurgencies.

The twentieth century brought the fever of revolution to Latin America. The Mexican, Cuban, Bolivian, and Nicaraguan revolutions left other countries with two understandings: the military must remain vigilant against internal uprising, and the military must forestall any economic crisis that would threaten the fragile social structures in the region. The specter of revolution grew with the deepening of the Cold War, as the threat took an ideological as well as anti-establishment stance. The legacy of insurgency movements in Latin America has reinforced the role of the military in politics, resulting in the threat of harsh repression if any insurgent threat reappears.<sup>20</sup> The end of the Cold War has done nothing to reduce the social pressures that still plague the region.

Latin American militaries responded to the new security challenges and economic opportunities by supplanting civilian governments throughout the region. By 1978, most of Latin American countries were under military rule, with Colombia, Venezuela, and Costa Rica retaining vestiges of democratic rule.<sup>21</sup> Latin American militaries were responding to the threat of Castro-inspired leftist revolution in the region, increasing social unrest, and economic downturns that introduced hyperinflation to the continent. Protection of *la patria* had a direct meaning: preventing communism from destroying the state from within or without. Direct assaults by the Left, coupled with economic downturns, led Latin American militaries to take over their governments until the political conditions were returned to the status quo and the economic downturn was reversed. Latin American militaries still remain on guard protecting the nation, but are

facing even more complex threats to *la patria*. These threats, if not eliminated, may very well put the region back on the revolutionary path.

Most Latin American countries have avoided the violent cycle of revolution, but remain vulnerable to intrastate conflict. The relative strength of the military, coupled with its perceived role of protector of the nation, has circumvented the effects of full fever, staving off a cure but keeping the state chronically weak. The state remains vulnerable to new crises, many of which Latin American militaries are ill-equipped to combat. More importantly, the long-standing issues of class, poverty, and economic modernization remain unsolved. These issues may grow so large that the military may be incapable of restoring order. Additionally, military officers are no longer an isolated elite who are immune to these problems. All of society must wrestle with how to address these issues, or the state will continue to suffer, awaiting the suspended agony of intrastate conflict. The United states must contemplate those countries that are at greater risk of collapse, and that impact on US interests in the region. Those countries must be understood to determine the nature of their strategic setting, their vulnerability to intrastate conflict, and whether the military will act to protect the state, the political and economic elite, or the masses. Understanding the military, and the actions of its leaders, becomes an important component in contemplating the likelihood of intrastate conflict in Latin America.

Venezuela presents an interesting case study in light of the preceding discussion of theories of intrastate conflict. Long considered a stable, growing democracy that successfully avoided despotic rule in the later half of the twentieth century, Venezuela must now come to grips with tremendous political upheaval. The peaceful revolution led

by former coup leader Hugo Chávez comes during a time of deep economic crisis and class divisiveness. The disenfranchised political elite grows increasingly frustrated as Chávez, with the overwhelming support of the large underclass, rewrites political history in order to bring prosperity to all Venezuelans. Venezuela's role as a leading oil producer and an example of stability in a region that is wracked with great instability should draw the attention of SOUTHCOM in order ensure the country does not devolve into political chaos.

## CHAPTER THREE

### VENEZUELA - AN EMERGING CRISIS?

Venezuela has the dual distinction of enjoying one of the longest periods of democratic rule and having one of the most spectacular histories of strongman rule in Latin America. Venezuelans consider Simón Bolívar its “Liberator” from the Wars of Independence, and identifies with his desires for freedom and order. It was not always that way. Venezuela gained its independence in 1821, but in a few short years the country’s elite rejected Bolívar’s notion of a confederation of states that would form one great nation.<sup>22</sup> By 1830, Venezuelans had devolved into strongman rule. This former backwater in the Spanish colonial empire languished as regional leaders fought for the right to run the country, or more accurately, manage the national territory to his benefit. Venezuela’s political history was marked by despotic rule, political instability, and constant threat of palace coups.<sup>23</sup> The twentieth century brought a fundamental change to Venezuela that would necessitate a change in this chaotic political process.

Dictator Juan Vicente Gómez governed Venezuela with absolute control in the early part of the 1900s, paving the way for political consolidation and the growth of a political opposition in the face of expanding economic opportunities. Traditionally known as the last great strongman, Gómez sought to modernizing Venezuela. His contributions included a permanent national military and an effective state bureaucracy based in the capital of Caracas.<sup>24</sup> These two changes placed power with the state, and no longer with regional strongmen, making the elite beholden to the government in Caracas. The discovery of oil early in the Gómez administration’s tenure empowered the state with the

finances to actually implement national policy. Oil also brought the country into the international economy. Caracas grew even stronger as the elite flocked to the capital to reap the benefits of close ties with “North Atlantic capitalism” as a result of the booming state-controlled oil industry.<sup>25</sup> The nationalization of the armed forces institutionalized state monopoly of force, which allowed for sustained economic growth during the first part of the twentieth century. The national armed forces presided over the transition of the Venezuelan economy from an agricultural base to petroleum production and export.<sup>26</sup> The nationalization of the armed forces did not guarantee an end to violence as a means to resolve political contestation, however. The Gómez regime ended with his death in 1938, and Venezuela would flirt with democracy for the first time.

During this time the Venezuelan military began to establish a consciousness of their role and mission to the nation, which would bring them into the political debate after the Gómez regime. The vacuum caused by Gómez’s death resulted in a growth of political activity as civic groups, political parties, and student organizations jockeyed for a constituency. The two most enduring and influential political parties to emerge were the Democratic Action Party (AD) and the Christian Democratic Party (COPEI).<sup>27</sup> This foray into formal political processes in Venezuela did not fare well initially. Proposals by President Rómulo Gallegos and the ruling AD party in 1945 to redistribute wealth, status, and power in Venezuela was met with swift retribution by the military, who initially supported the movement. The traditional elite convinced the military to wrest power from Gallegos and AD in 1948, leading to ten years of military rule.<sup>28</sup> The military stepped in to thwart efforts at social upheaval. The military also anticipated the political fallout if AD implemented its policy of redistribution without broad support. The

military stepped in to preserve *la patria*, and to institute its form of anti-politics that would keep the country's class system intact, and protect the ever-growing economy.

The major political parties formalized a unique system of contestation in Venezuela after the ouster of Jiménez in 1958 designed to ensure stability during the transfer of power between political opponents. The Pact of Punto Fijo provided for power sharing between competing political groups and the civic groups that formed their constituencies. The vast state bureaucracy provided sufficient government positions to spread among the political party leadership, while the revenues from oil exports provided the finances to secure the loyalty of supporting civic groups and the masses.<sup>29</sup> The military played an important role in this new form of democratic bargaining. Not only did the military oust the Jiménez regime, paving the way for civilian rule, but also receive assurances that their primacy as the nation's monopoly of force and protector of the state would also be guaranteed. The Pact provided for increased benefits, improved equipment, quicker promotions, and more frequent opportunities for command for the armed forces. Additionally, politicians began to court the officer corps through initiating informal affiliations by officers with one party or another, creating personal obligations between officers and politicians.<sup>30</sup> This was an important start to establishing civilian control in Venezuela, but the specter of intrastate conflict made an even stronger impact in providing a military purpose for the armed forces.

The newly formed “pacted” democratic rule in Venezuela would receive a stern test as it faced its first intrastate challenge. The Communist Party remained the only political group outside of the system of shared power. This group, as well as leftist radicals in the other political parties, were marginalized to reduce the roadblock to coalition building

among the signatories of the Pact of Punto Fijo.<sup>31</sup> This resulted in an intense dispute with the Left, which resulted in the organization of a small guerrilla force poised to regain its political voice. The Venezuelan insurgency lasted from 1961 to 1965. The military received training and support from the United States, and rapidly became a force capable of joint counterinsurgency operations.<sup>32</sup> The Venezuelan military's achievements in this campaign solidified its support of the system of shared democracy formalized in the Pact of Punto Fijo.<sup>33</sup> Now the military had proven their support by shedding their blood in the defense of the Pact. Interestingly, this loyalty appeared more rooted in the informal courting of officers through party affiliation and with budgetary incentives, not as a result of an overarching purpose that would transcend political whims, or economic downturns. Both would cause some in the military to reconsider their allegiance.

As the country flourished under the banner of Venezuelan democracy in the 1960s and 1970s, the military remained in the barracks and out of politics. The primary effect of the Pact of Punto Fijo is that the agreement institutionalized a method of political conflict that assured power sharing even when a party lost the major elections.<sup>34</sup> The impact of oil revenues to the country during this period had a significant impact. The concept of a power-sharing democracy is quite effective when there is abundant revenues to accommodate all interest groups. From 1979 to 1989, Venezuela earned over eighty percent of its oil revenues in the twentieth century.<sup>35</sup> The government not only had the funds to accommodate the original political signatories of the Pact of Punto Fijo, but also the defeated Leftist guerrillas, the populace, and the military. The military received a pardon for its participation in the Pérez Jiménez regime, gained increased funds for modernization and quality of life issues, and maintained compulsory military service.

More importantly, the military received the informal, but very real role of being the repository of national values.<sup>36</sup> This peaceful relationship remained brittle, however, floating on the hope that oil revenues would flow unabated and the economy would continue to grow. The failure of either to continue would put all agreements in jeopardy.

Venezuela's success in the oil industry belies an unstable economy when the primary revenue maker loses market value and when the government accumulates debt ahead of earnings and investments. The 1980s are characterized as the "lost decade" as Venezuela failed to take advantage of billions of dollars in oil revenues in the 1970s to broaden and deepen its economy, invest in the national infrastructure, and provide greater services to its people. Instead, government corruption soared as the money disappeared into wasteful state and local projects, political party treasuries, and personal accounts outside of the country.<sup>37</sup> President Carlos Andres Pérez unwittingly broke the spirit of the Pact of Punto Fijo in 1989 through his efforts at fixing Venezuela's hemorrhaging economy. Pérez instituted an economic austerity plan designed to address government corruption and poor economic policy.<sup>38</sup> He received the wrath of Venezuelan society as his plan threatened the financial position of virtually every sector of society. The growing political, social and economic fallout from the Pérez plan began to threaten the "national values" that the signatories of the Pact charged the military to protect. The military responded with two coup attempts in 1992, one of which led by current President Hugo Chávez, then an army lieutenant colonel.<sup>39</sup> The government maintained power and Chávez served two years in prison for his actions. The events exposed the weaknesses of the Venezuelan system, and required immediate attention to avert the rebirth of strongman rule.

As the political elite stumbled through its assessment of the crisis, Chávez began to gain a political voice that would propel him to the presidency. His political ideology began as a reflection of the broad objectives of the Venezuelan Liberator Simón Bolívar. It is codified as “Boliviarian Messianism” that purports a revolutionary populism targeted at the poor masses, who stand to gain the most from this ideology, and the political and economic elites who are vilified as corrupt criminals.<sup>40</sup> In a speech given in Washington, DC, Chávez further defined his ideological views.

As soldiers we have been trained to protect democracy. This is a trait that the soldiers in Venezuela share with many of you. But for us it has a special significance given that we are the flag carriers of a proud and glorious past in which an army was created with the purpose of liberating a nation and achieving independence. The aim was never to conquer other nations or dominate its own people. It was with these ideals that the army of Venezuela was created under the leadership of Simon Bolivar and a generation of soldiers that included thinkers who established new republics just as George Washington did here. A soldier and a creator of democratic institutions that completely refutes the notion that the image of a military uniform smacks of tyranny as is said in certain quarters. Some say that I am a tyrant merely because I am a Lieutenant Colonel. There are some, however, who clad in civilian clothing are far worse tyrants than any warrior. We in the military should do away with that stigma once and for all.<sup>41</sup>

Chávez represents to some a second savior in Venezuela. His policies are oriented towards harnessing the resources of the country to benefit the people. Others view him as a twenty-first century strongman whose actions are designed to create a new oligarch, with Chávez at the helm and the military more deeply involved in civil society.

The military under Chávez is charged with great responsibilities in support of renewing economic vitality in Venezuela. Dubbed the “Plan Bolívar 2000”, the revitalization project places the military in the vanguard of renewal process. He intends to use fifty thousand troops and nearly one billion dollars in the early stages to execute the

plan.<sup>42</sup> The Plan includes public works, infrastructure, and housing projects, as well as projects designed to optimize science, technology, professional, entrepreneurs, volunteers and youth.<sup>43</sup> What is troubling to some is the overwhelming presence of the military at all levels of this project. At least one hundred seventy military officers have been placed in charge of almost all key government positions.<sup>44</sup> While the goal of revitalizing Venezuelan society is noble, Chávez's methods seem reminiscent of the old strong man and military rule. His efforts must end the corruption that plagued the Venezuelan government. Otherwise, his detractors will state he is merely a military strongman hiding behind a thin veil of democratic transparency. At this point, many wonder if his actions are nothing more than a peaceful coup that will further suspend revolutionary change, or precipitate a move to violent conflict.

The Venezuelan military has been in a precarious situation since the beginning of the Chávez administration. How does this corporate body, sworn to protect the nation and beholden to the traditional political leadership, respond to a former coup leader who is now the commander in chief, and has sworn to reform the system and hold the corrupt leadership (including the military) accountable? While Chávez first year and a half have been met with stern obedience by the military, the period has not passed without the rumor of an impending coup. Recently, retired air force general Francisco Visconti talked out loud about the possibility of a coup to oust his fellow coup leader, while a group of former officers who opposed the coup formed a group called the Institutional Military Front to voice opposition of Chávez's policies.<sup>45</sup> The military is concerned that Chávez will forever rupture all institutional processes in the country. His efforts will either lead to his ascendancy as a long-term strongman like Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori, or

he will cause such disruption as to provoke a violent internal conflict between the Chávez regime and those who feel he has negated their influence in the government.<sup>46</sup> In either case, Venezuela stands a greater chance today of falling victim to intrastate conflict. This possibility would have a grave impact on a continent that is struggling to deepen democratic institutions and find peaceful means of political expression. Venezuela avoided the rash of military coups of the previous thirty years. Maybe the country only succeeded in delaying the inevitable. While Venezuela is certainly more unstable than in the past, it has not crossed the point of no return. Effective US policy applied now may provide the counterweight to keep Venezuela from reaching that point.

Panama also presents a challenge to SOUTHCOM in its endeavor to maintain a stable region. The country has seen the removal of all US forces from its country to Miami and Puerto Rico. The US government has also completed the transfer of the Panama Canal. Now Panama is faced with the daunting task of truly making its own way as a country without the convenient presence of US military power within its borders. The country has an eleven thousand man police force that must contemplate protecting the Canal and the Canal Zone as well as face increased drug activity and border violations by Colombian irregular forces and refugees. The defense of the Panama Canal remains an imperative to US military forces, and SOUTHCOM must understand the challenges Panama faces to provide the necessary support to avert a crisis so soon after departing the country.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### PANAMA - IS THE CANAL A STRATEGIC CONCERN?

The tiny isthmus that is the country of Panama has been a prized territory throughout history. Since the pre-Columbian period, peoples have used the narrow strip of land to transit from one continent to another. In the colonial period, merchants crossed the terrain to get goods from the New world to Europe. The desire to reduce sea transit time in the late nineteenth century initiated a race to build a canal in Central America, and after many fits and false starts, the Panama Canal was built. Today the Canal is in the hands of the Panamanian government for the first time in its history. The shorter route enjoyed by shipping that transit the canal remains important today; the concern is that Panama may be unable to properly administer and protect the Canal. Political intrigue and military involvement in government make up a large part of Panama's short history. Those factors may again weaken the government, placing the administration of the Canal in peril.

Spanish explorers quickly seized the importance of Panama in their quest to move good between the seas. Christopher Columbus established a short-lived settlement in Panama one year after its discovery in 1502. Within fifteen years, the Spanish made the stretch of land an important trans-shipment point for the goods and precious metals extracted from the New World colonies.<sup>47</sup> The thought of building a canal began in these early years. The Spanish crown commissioned a survey on the feasibility of building a canal in the 1520s, but abandoned the notion in the mid century.<sup>48</sup> The Spanish continued to use the area as a trans-shipment point, moving cargo across land from one ocean to

another. The attraction of the crossing, and of the precious metals and other valued goods that crossed Panama, resulted in periods of unrest as a result of pirate intrigue.<sup>49</sup> The attraction of this transit way would continue to alter the course of Panamanian history.

The rise of the state of Panama was not a result of revolutionary zeal and idealism run amuck, but of the calculated desire of the Panamanian elite to benefit from the projected windfall as a result of foreign interest in building a canal through the isthmus. The Wars of Independence resulted in the eventual formation of the state of Colombia, of which Panama formed the extreme northern portion. The French and the United States began to demonstrate great interest in a canal in Central America in the 1850s. The French won a concession from Colombia in 1878 to build a canal through Panama, only to end the project in failure in 1889.<sup>50</sup> The United States, long interested in a Central American canal, took the opportunity to reinvigorate the canal project. Political and financial intrigue led to Panama's revolt from Colombia, paving the way for a US canal project along the isthmus.<sup>51</sup> This inauspicious beginning for Panama would influence the formation of governmental institutions and the logic of power sharing, which prevented Panama from developing sound processes of governance.

The details of the Panama Canal treaty would directly affect the formation and development of Panamanian governmental organs, as well as their role in society. The Hay Bunau-Varilla treaty made this new country a colony of sorts, beholden to the United States. The treaty was cemented by the creation of the Panamanian constitution, which granted the US inordinate amounts of influence in the country.<sup>52</sup> The Panamanian elite had little to say in this matter, so it set about consolidating power in the rest of the

country. One important move executed by the Panamanian government was the abolition of the military.

The Panamanian Revolutionary Army was nothing more than a battalion of former Colombian soldiers that defected to the rebel cause. Despite being hailed as a national hero, the presence of General Estéban Huertas worried both the Panamanian elite and the United States.<sup>53</sup> Upon an attempt to use the small force to influence a political issue, Panamanian President Manuel Amador forced General Estéban Huertas into retirement and disbanded the military.<sup>54</sup> President Amador replaced the military with a national police force, initiating a struggle between the political leadership and the military over roles and missions that would explode in crisis some sixty years later.

Despite abolishing the military to prevent it from interfering in politics, the Panamanian elite continued to use force as a means to impose their will on domestic political opponents. Between 1904 and 1941, the National Police served at the behest of the President, who employed the force to protect himself from overthrow. Simultaneously, opposition forces would seek to control key police stations in their bids for power.<sup>55</sup> The military began to consolidate power as the National Police and its leadership became more professionalized, militarized, and politicized. Under the guidance of second in command Lieutenant Colonel José Antonio Remón, the National Police became the National Guard, and he used this new tool as a political platform to propel himself into the presidency in 1952.<sup>56</sup> Although the civilian leadership succeeded in ousting Remón from the presidency, and placing a commander in the Guard that had no political ambitions, the politicization of the National Guard remained an institutional feature that would present new despots a vehicle to the presidency.

The forays into military rule became institutionalized in Panamanian political life with the rise of Brigadier General Omar Torrijos. Torrijos headed the military junta that ousted President Arnulfo Arias in 1968, and emerged as the chief political power in Panama until his death in 1981.<sup>57</sup> What changed in this military overthrow was no only the influence of senior officers, but also junior officers in political circles. By 1968, there were a significant number of majors and captains who received professional military training abroad, gaining the respect as a peer by the political elite.<sup>58</sup> The officers felt they were on equal footing with the politicians, and when President Arias threatened to alter their command structure, they took matters into their own hands.<sup>59</sup> The military coup realized the goal of wresting the grip on power away from the political elite, and giving it to those that would ostensibly represent the needs of the greater society. When Torrijos took control, officer demographics represented the lower-middle class who had received training in Mexican and Central American military academies.<sup>60</sup> These officers would bring a brand of populism to the political process, dictating the direction of all facets in Panamanian life for the next twenty years.

The ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties in 1978 and the death of General Torrijos in 1981 ushered in yet another period of abrupt political change in Panama, and placed the Panamanian military on a collision course with US military forces. Negotiations to amend the Hay Bunau-Varilla treaty began in the middle 1960s, culminating in the signatures by President Carter and General Torrijos in 1978. The treaty called for the assumption of control of the Canal by the Panamanians and the elimination of US military presence by December 31, 1999.<sup>61</sup> The prospect of

Panamanian control over the most significant activity in the country coincided with the increased criminalization of the National Guard after Torrijos' death.

The assumption of control of the Canal not only altered the bilateral relationship between the United States and Panama, but also the delicate domestic social, political, and economic structures that were controlled by the Panamanian government. Groups such as labor unions would have an increased say in Panamanian politics, as they represented a well paid and highly skilled workforce not previously under the control of partisan politics.<sup>62</sup> Additionally, whoever was in power could exert influence in the Canal Zone through preferential hiring , ensuring loyal lieutenants were in influential positions. As the Panamanian military leadership postured to reap this monetary windfall, military infighting and deteriorating relations with the US would weaken their grip on power.

The death of General Torrijos was followed by a rapid turnover of power in the Guard as a host of officers vied for the right to replace him. General Paredes ascended to the position of commander of the National Guard, and began to put the military outside of politics. Colonel Manuel Noreiga and others pressured Paredes to step aside, and formed a new junta oriented to regain military control over domestic politics and to agitate US-Panamanian relations.<sup>63</sup> The first thing Noriega did was to change the name, roles and missions of the National Guard. The National Legislative Council passed Law 20 in September 1983, naming the armed forces the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) and giving the military the primary mission of providing national defense and safeguarding the country's territorial integrity.<sup>64</sup> This new force became Noriega's personal tool to intimidate his enemies, and to challenge US presence in Panama.

Operation Just Cause brought an end to the Panamanian military and reintroduced civilian leadership in Panamanian politics. Noriega began to menace not only his domestic opposition, but also the US military and their families located in Panama. During his time as commander of the PDF, the country endured six presidents in six years.<sup>65</sup> He was involved with the appointments and removals through manipulating the leadership in the president's political party. During this time, a number of politicians were beaten or killed. Dr. Hugo Spadafora, a noted critic of Noriega, was found headless in Costa Rica in September 1985.<sup>66</sup> The business community also felt manipulated by Noriega. He funneled all business transactions through his personal staff, excluding the established business community from the benefits of corruption.<sup>67</sup> Panama slipped into political turmoil, leading Noriega to provoke the US as a means to rally support for his regime.

Noriega's grip on power slipped badly in 1989. The people voted for anti-Noriega candidates in the national elections by over three to one. He narrowly averted a coup attempt from within his own ranks.<sup>68</sup> He turned his attention to the US, which had increased the diplomatic and economic pressure throughout the year. The decreasing safety to US forces and civilians led to the initiation of Operation Just Cause. The operation lasted just seven days, bringing an end to Noriega's reign and the existence of the PDF.<sup>69</sup> With that, Panama returned to a political life dominated by civilian politicians. The daunting challenges of the turnover of the Canal, and increased transnational threats, would provide the new challenges for Panama in the 1990s.

As the Panamanian government contemplates a life without the US military in the country and US administration of the Canal, it faces three distinct challenges. The first is

the security of the canal itself. The US reserves the right to intervene if the free flow of sea traffic through the Canal is threatened.<sup>70</sup> The Panamanians have the task of securing the Canal, but have not the means to do so in the event of a major crisis. One concern is the increased presence of the Chinese through civilian holdings in the Zone that have ties to the Chinese military.<sup>71</sup> The US has a distinct challenge to influence events along the Canal without military presence.

The second challenge is incursions along Panama's border with Colombia. The Darien region has been a long-neglected area, but has gained increased interest with guerrilla activity spilling over from Colombia. The Panamanian government deployed over two thousand police to the eastern region in Operation Peace and Sovereignty 1998, but the forces were ill prepared to rid the region and its people of such a difficult military problem.<sup>72</sup> Additionally, the civil war in Colombia has triggered a flood of refugees in the region. This tide of displaced civilians exacerbate an already desperate economic situation, and also serve to induce rebel or paramilitary forces to enter Panamanian territory to exact revenge on the Colombian refugees.<sup>73</sup>

Finally, there has been a marked increase in transnational activity since the departure of the US military from Panama. The US no longer bases its counter-drug operations from Panama, which has led to increased activity of drug traffic through the area.<sup>74</sup> Panama has also seen a rise in arms trafficking through the country.<sup>75</sup> The conduits for illegal activity are much more pronounced now that Panama is left to fend for herself. Panama faces the task of dealing with these issues before domestic pressures influence a reemergence of the military strongman and authoritarian rule. It becomes an imperative for the US to address this issue in order to prevent a crisis from unfolding.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SOUTHCOM - AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLAN

My vision of the future for this region is succinctly stated in our recently published unclassified Theater Strategy:  
*A community of democratic, stable and prosperous nations successfully countering illicit drug activities and other transnational threats; served by professional, modernized, interoperable security forces that embrace democratic principles, respect human rights, are subordinate to civil authority, and are capable and supportive of multilateral responses to challenges.*<sup>76</sup>

These words, spoken by the commander of United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) General Charles Wilhelm, provided the focal point for the SOUTHCOM Theater Engagement Plan (TEP). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3113.01 spells out the requirements for this relatively new task for the CINCs. Each CINC is required to create a TEP in order to meet his strategic goals in theater, and to meet the goals set out for his area of responsibility as stated in the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).<sup>77</sup>

The TEP is created after the completion of the Theater Strategy, which discusses the strategic environment, and lists the command's mission, and CINC's strategic goals and aims. The TEP is primarily designed to address how the CINC intends to shape his Area of responsibility (AOR). SOUTHCOM's Theater Strategy highlights the existence of fragile democracies in the region that are challenged by issues such as unbalanced income distribution, rapid population growth, proliferating transnational dangers, and a populace that demands results from a decade of democratic renewal.<sup>78</sup> This passage demonstrates

an understanding on the part of SOUTHCOM of the complexity of the region's strategic environment, and the issues it must face as it contemplates its TEP.

Given the unique challenges of the region, SOUTHCOM determined the following mission statement:

USSOUTHCOM shapes the environment within its area of responsibility by conducting theater engagement and counterdrug activities in order to promote democracy, stability and collective approaches to threats to regional security; when required responds unilaterally or multilaterally to crises that threaten regional stability or national interests,<sup>79</sup> and prepares to meet future hemispheric challenges.<sup>79</sup>

In this case, the TEP has as its purpose the promotion of democracy, stability, and collective approaches to regional security. This portion of the mission statement appropriately addresses the essence of the regional challenges. The Theater Strategy also provides the CINC's strategic aims designed to allow US forces to shape the AOR.

These aims are:

- Sustain, strengthen, and expand multilateral security cooperation with security forces in the region
- Assist in development of roles and missions, and appropriate modernization of regional security forces
- Assist in peaceful resolution of disputes and promote confidence and security building measures
- Promote and support democratic institutions, civilian control of military/security forces
- Promote and support respect for human rights and the environment, and adherence to the rule of law.<sup>80</sup>

This guidance will form the rationale for SOUTHCOM's TEP, and are informed by a comprehensive understanding of the strategic situation. Coupled with the information provided in the Theater Strategy is the SOUTHCOM Strategic Plan, which provides focus, priorities, and guidance for engagement in the AOR. The basic concept of

operations is focused on preparation for humanitarian assistance in times of disaster, peacekeeping, countering transnational threats, and counterdrug operations.

SOUTHCOM intends to do this by first establishing regional approaches to these areas of concentration, then engendering inter-regional linkages, and finally facilitating hemispheric approaches recognizing international cooperation.<sup>81</sup> This planning effort provides the structure for SOUTHCOM to create and execute its TEP.

The TEP is SOUTHCOM's charter for accomplishing its shaping activities in the AOR. The TEP is nothing more than an operational campaign plan for peacetime engagement, defining operational objectives and tasks required to achieve strategic aims and goals.<sup>82</sup> The SOUTHCOM TEP provides an interesting insight on the successes and challenges that face the command in devising a plan to accomplish its mission. The discussion of the strategic setting that identified broad hemispheric is further refined in the TEP by country and by region.<sup>83</sup> What is reflected is a deep understanding of each country through the application of a conceptual framework that incorporates the theories of intrastate conflict. Additionally the TEP identifies areas of strategic significance, such as Venezuela's oil producing importance to the US<sup>84</sup> These two factors are the primary building blocks in the identification of objectives and tasks to be met by military forces in the accomplishment of strategic aims. Among the objectives identified in the TEP are the subordination and accountability of security forces to a civilian minister in an elected civilian government, the reduction of corruption in military institutions, and the transformation of security forces roles and missions tailored to respond to legitimate national or multilateral challenges.<sup>85</sup> The TEP provides a useful framework for

accomplishing the CINC's shaping strategic aims. Applied to Venezuela and Panama offer interesting insights on execution of the TEP.

Venezuela and the United States have enjoyed years of close relations. This is reflected by the number of exchanges between the two countries in a variety of areas. SOUTHCOM has a strong presence through the US Military Group stationed at the main Venezuelan army post in Caracas. Venezuelan officers are a regular installment in US military schools.<sup>86</sup> The election of President Hugo Chávez has cooled relations to a great extent. While military to military contact continues, Chávez has taken great pain to keep US operational forces from entering the country. He ended negotiations aimed at granting overflight privileges of Venezuelan airspace to US counterdrug planes as an alternative to the loss of Howard Air Force base in Panama.<sup>87</sup> In another case, SOUTHCOM reacted swiftly to the devastating mudslide in Venezuela just before Christmas 1999, deploying troops by ship to the coast at the request of the Venezuelan government to assist in the humanitarian relief effort. Just before the US troops arrived, President Chávez refused permission for the troops to enter the country.<sup>88</sup> In the tradition of Simón Bolívar, Chávez resisted any foreign influence that would compromise the country's sovereignty, despite the intention. Efforts to influence the Venezuelan military roles and missions were also upstaged by Chávez's initiative to rewrite the Venezuelan constitution.<sup>89</sup> However, Chávez undermines efforts to depoliticize the military by placing active and retired officers in civilian governmental positions. Any efforts to affect the process of democratization and preempt any impending crises that may affect Venezuela will be thwarted by Chávez.

US relations with Panama have been somewhat warmer, despite years of animosity. The granting of the Canal to Panama has been a somewhat liberating experience for the Panamanian government. Eager to gain control of the valued Zone territory and military bases, Panama ended negotiations to maintain a multinational counterdrug center at Howard Air Force base.<sup>90</sup> With regard to support of their domestic security forces, the Panamanians have been more forthcoming with requests for assistance. SOUTHCOM has engaged with Panama in a number of ways. Representatives from SOUTHCOM have helped Panama write their National Security Strategy, focused on the national interests of canal defense, protection of their border, and transnational crime. The reality is that the force is only capable of dealing with terrorist level threats, and would require significant assistance in the event of a major crisis.<sup>91</sup> Dealing with a national police force, and the issue of combating transnational crime requires expertise from the US interagency, which brings up a significant shortfall in the SOUTHCOM TEP.

While the SOUTHCOM TEP does a good job at describing the complex nature of intrastate conflict as it manifests in different countries, it fails in providing more than a military response to a suite of problems that require input from other instruments of national power. General Wilhelm highlighted the need for interagency involvement in his 1999 Posture Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee with regard to counterdrug operations.<sup>92</sup> As a part of national strategy, the military aspect must be coordinated with the interagency to present a coherent, synergistic policy approach in the region. The US Military Groups in each country work with the Embassy country team as the CINC's representative concerning implementing TEP in the country.<sup>93</sup> Concerns abound about making the interagency process work. One concern is that the TEP process

is still immature, and has yet to capture all of the military aspects of the shaping imperative in order to maximize the efforts of the interagency.<sup>94</sup> Another concern is that the interagency must be more involved with the social, economic, and political aspects of the regional issues to facilitate greater success in TEP implementation.<sup>95</sup> As always the case, funding is an issue that hinders the effectiveness of TEP as well. One problem SOUTHCM is addressing is the fact that engagement activities are not funded through a separate line, but saps money from readiness and modernization accounts during execution.<sup>96</sup> Work with TEP must continue to make it a powerful tool in the CINC's repertoire of assets to influence the region. A greater presence from the interagency and better funding procedures will go a long way in enabling the CINC to achieve his aims.

Other government programs aid in meeting CINCSOUTHCOM's strategic aims through TEP. The US Army School of Americas (SOA) exposes Latin American students to a comprehensive program of military, human rights, domestic support, and law of land warfare training. The SOA is a key and essential tool of the CINC to impact the Latin American military culture in accordance to SOUTHCOM strategic aims.<sup>97</sup> Additionally the National Defense University supports SOUTHCOM's efforts at promoting civilian control of the military. The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies fill a void in Latin America for civilian education in matters of national defense and security policy as well as the military profession and military affairs.<sup>98</sup> Over time this will prepare a new generation of civilians educated in defense matters, making them qualified and competent to head the defense ministry. These two schools allow the CINC to exploit a forum for the introduction of a broader range of skill sets to the future

military leadership in Latin America. The continuation of the programs will be essential to realize success in TEP execution.

SOUTHCOM TEP requires much more than an understanding and application of theory to be successful. The command is implementing national strategy as it relates to the AOR. Implementation of national strategy requires the full participation of the interagency to gain meaningful ground in attaining strategic goals. The military planners have done their part in crafting a plan for achieving these goals. DOD and State must work together to ensure all aspects of national power are brought to bear in a mutually supportive way to ensure success in implementing national policy in Latin America.

## CHAPTER SIX

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The concept of intrastate conflict has great utility for the military planner in this era of expanded military missions. Through the skillful application of the concept, the planner can account for the myriad causes of intrastate conflict and apply military power to prevent a conflict from devolving into a crisis. It is important to note that an understanding of intrastate conflict should inform the military planner that the application of military power alone may have a limited affect on the outcome of the situation, or may precipitate the initiation of armed conflict. The societal factors of unresolved political competition, economic crisis, bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency, class antagonism, inflammatory idealists, weak military forces, and poor linkages between the political leadership and the military comprise the necessary antecedents for revolution as described by Brinton. Factor in the notion of the failed state, and the competition for political power becomes simply a violent contest for the few fruits in a barren garden. These notions become an important framework in understanding the nature of intrastate conflict.

In Latin America, countries have the burden of shouldering another legacy in their political history. The rule of the military strongman grew out of necessity during the Wars of Independence. No logic existed in the hinterland for the fostering of political and social institutions designed to govern a country. Instead the rule of law spoke through the end of a barrel, or on the tip of a sword. The legacy of the Latin American strongman haunted the region in the form 1964 to 1988, when all but six Central and South American countries experienced the pain of authoritarian rule. As the region

contemplates the twenty-first century, it must address many of the antecedents Brinton described in his discussion of intrastate conflict. Many countries face serious economic problems, coupled by deeper divisions along class lines and a growing dissatisfaction with the pace and depth of democratization. Only Colombia faces a significant insurgency threat. The rest of Latin America must be wary of a return to authoritarian rule and the return of the military strongman. Venezuelans elected a former coup leader who is bent on realizing his vision of liberty and equality. Venezuelan in and out of uniform fear President Chávez is not above using force to maintain his grip on power, like Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, to remain in office.<sup>99</sup> Panamanians are only ten years removed from the excesses of military rule under Manuel Noriega. Their young democratic government must shoulder many burdens while it begins the process of democratization again. These are two countries that comprise important interests to the United States. If either country falls victim to a political crisis, other state institutions may be too brittle to withstand a breakdown in governance, which would affect the region and the world.

US SOUTHCOM has the daunting task to devise a Theater Engagement Plan that foresees impending crises and applies military power to prevent a crisis from unfolding. Their task is not easy. General Wilhelm described his AOR as an economy of force region, but cautions that success does not come for free<sup>100</sup> SOUTHCOM has identified the need to incorporate the TEP into the ordinary military budgeting cycle to provide the right resources, training opportunities, and military to military contacts to make a difference in the region. More importantly, SOUTHCOM requires the assistance through the interagency to apply the full suite of national power when executing TEP. Latin

America has many problems that fall out of the US military's ability to affect. Continued interaction with Latin American militaries provide an indirect route to addressing these problems. A better method is the close coordination with each embassy country team to leverage diplomatic, economic, and informational tools that make achieving the CINC's strategic aims a much easier prospect. The Department of State is the lead agent for the President of the United States in a foreign country. State can make the difference between implementing foreign policy that uses the combined strengths of all sources of national power, or implementing stovepipe foreign policy that is uncoordinated, counterproductive, and ineffective.

This monograph attempted to address the utility of applying theories of intrastate conflict to understand the nature of the strategic environment. The military planner can not only analyze where a country is along the trajectory of conflict, but where it has been and where it may likely go. This understanding can inform military plans that alter, reverse, or stop the trajectory of conflict. The United States has taken deliberate steps to change its relationship with Latin America. The removal of forces from Panama represents this change to one of cooperation, not coercion. The U.S remains committed to security in the Western hemisphere. An effective Theater Engagement Plan is the primary means to maintain security in the region. Military planners must continue to inform plans with theory, as well as bring the interagency into the planning community. Only then can the nation expect regional commanders to achieve meaningful strategic goals.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> The White House. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, D.C., 1999), 39.

<sup>2</sup> Major Linwood Ham, Jr., "The Failed State - Implications for Military Operations." (MMAS mono., Advanced Military Studies Program, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1999), 6-12. Brinton's model was a fundamental part of the theory of intrastate conflict in this paper. Brinton's application of this "conceptual scheme" in the cases of the American, French, English, and Russian Revolutions led to some important observations. He saw these countries undergoing a crisis as a result of financial instability. This crisis threatened to put a halt to an period of economic vitality in the private sector. Those outside the halls of power find fault with those in power and the inefficient system they manage. At this point ideals begin to emerge among the disgruntled, and form the basis of an "illegal governmental", a base of opposition to the "Old Regime". The Old Regime leadership attempt to collect taxes from the people to alleviate the financial crisis, which fuels discontent throughout society and connects the illegal governmental leaders to the masses. Inept use of the military spell the swift end of the Old Regime and propels the revolutionaries to power. Internal fighting among revolutionary factions leads to the ascendancy of the "Radicals", who strive to emplace the revolutionary ideals in place. Over time, the radicals begin to address the pressing needs of the nation (expansion, modernity, external threats) and the ideals become part of nation's mythology. Brinton emphasized that the state was changed, but the structure remained intact. He suggests that this process is necessary and proper for a nation to undergo in order to sustain domestic economic prosperity, which is a necessary component to compete in the global economy.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 14-19. A number of scholars have contributed to the notion of the failed state. Political scientist Robert Jackson introduced the concept as "quasi-states" in 1994. He says that these quasi-states are formed out of the dual realities of sovereignty and dependence, making them a burden to the international community. Political scientist Stephen Krasner identified territoriality and autonomy as two fundamental components of the Westphalian state, and that conventions, contracting, coercion and imposition has always threatened the essence of statehood. Academic journal editor Amitai Etzioni noted that self determination has also been a fundamental part of state, but can sometimes be employed by an autocrat or dictator to pursue his personal desires or those of his support group. Political scientist I. William Zartman cite the influence of colonialism that compel new regimes to act only in the interests of its support group. Political scientist Augustus Richard Norton states that this tendency results in a breakdown of the rule of law, which will compel groups to affect their own brand of governance in the absence of the state.

<sup>4</sup> Simon Collier, Thomas Skidmore, and Harold Blakemore, ed., *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 220.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 221. The events in Europe created a vacuum that the *criollos* wished to fill. In their view, Spain offered no alternative to imperialism, which was provind to be an ever-increasing expense to the *criollo* class.

<sup>6</sup> Speech by Simón Bolívar in the Caracas Patriotic Society in Spanish, 3 June 1811, Virtual Library of Simón Bolívar, <http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/7609/eng/toc.html>; accessed 2 April 2000. This new country is called either New Granada or Grand Colombia. These refer to the lands that are now Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.

<sup>7</sup> Simón Bolívar to a gentleman on the island (of Jamaica), 6 September 1815, collection of letters, the University of the Andes, Mérida, Venezuela. This is essentially Latin America's version of a Declaration of Independence. Bolívar talks of the successes in the south, of the primacy of New Granada

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(Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama) in the long term success of the continent, and of the inevitability of the Spanish loss in the Americas. He states that those in America are in the best position to care for the destiny of this new world. The monarchy only stands to extract the wealth. Bolívar calls for a independent federal democracy based on human rights, civil liberties, and checks and balances.

<sup>8</sup> Gerald E. Fitzgerald. *The Political Thought of Bolívar* (The Hague, 1971); <http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/7609/eng/pap/fitzgerald.html>; accessed 3 April 2000. Fitzgerald argues that the essence of Bolívar's political aims was the unification of all of South America under "republicanism linked with responsibility." Fitzgerald also charts how that belief transformed over time to accommodate the realities of span of control and geography.

<sup>9</sup> Vicente Lecuna. *Selected Writings of Bolívar*, trans. Lewis Bertrand (New York: The Colonial Press, 1951), 765; <http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/7609/eng/bolivar/venezuela1813.html>; accessed 8 April 2000.

<sup>10</sup> Christon I Archer, ed. *The Wars of Independence in Spanish America* (Wilmington: Jaguar Books, 2000), 32.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 210. General Holstein served in Bolívar's army beginning in 1815, and wrote a scathing account of the politics of officership in Bolívar's army. Holstein viewed Bolívar as an unrefined womanizer, unlettered soldier, and an absentee general that either fled the battlefield in the face of defeat or was not present during rebel victories. The account offers another perspective on the Liberator and helps in the discussion of the rise of the strongman ruler.

<sup>12</sup> Lecuna, 765.

<sup>13</sup> Collier, Skidmore, and Blakemore, 223.

<sup>14</sup> Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., ed. *The Politics of Anti-Politics - the Military in Latin America* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Books, 1997), 6-8. The authors use Chile as an example of how this logic became the model for military intervention in governance in Latin America.

<sup>15</sup> Brian Loveman. *For la Patria - Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Books, 1999), 37. Loveman identified the concept of "la patria" as the evolving role of the Latin American military throughout its history. This belief exists more as a state of mind than an actual legal construct. Fundamental to the concept is the notion that the military knows no limits in the defense, protection, preservation, and sustainment of *la patria*. The military becomes the primary weapon against intrastate and interstate threats. The military must maintain the monopoly of force in order to accomplish its mission for *la patria*. The military is not necessarily tied to civilian control, especially when *la patria* is threatened. It can act against the government if it has put the nation at risk

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 59.

<sup>18</sup> Loveman and Davies, 5. The concept of anti-politics is closely related to the romanticized notion of defense of *la patria* as the unique role of the military. Anti-politics allows for a dispassionate approach to identifying what threatens the nation, and putting an end to that threat. The belief is that the function of politics causes the problems associated with social unrest, economic stagnancy, and popular insurgency. Any sector of civil society that threatens *la patria* becomes an illegitimate form of association.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 27.

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<sup>20</sup> Daniel Castro, ed. *Revolution and Revolutionaries - Guerrilla Movements in Latin America* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Books, 1999), xxxiv. This book provides a history of revolution movements in the history of Latin America. Castro argues that this phenomenon is still quite possible, despite the end of the Cold War.

<sup>21</sup> Howard J Wiarda and Harvey F Kline, ed. *Latin American Politics and Development* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 26.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 234.

<sup>23</sup> US Department of State, *Background Notes: Venezuela* (Washington: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, December 1999), Internet; [http://www.state.gov/www/background\\_notes/venezuela\\_1299\\_bgn.html](http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/venezuela_1299_bgn.html); accessed 18 February 2000.

<sup>24</sup> Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes - Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 85. The book discusses the nature of the disintegration of democracy by providing a comparative discussion of the problems in five Latin American countries in the latter half of the twentieth century.

<sup>25</sup> Wiarda and Kline, 235.

<sup>26</sup> *Background Notes - Venezuela*, Internet.

<sup>27</sup> Linz and Stepan, 87-89. Civil society began to flourish after Gómez's death. Many of the founders of AD and COPEI were jailed as student protesters under the dictator's regime. Both parties began to penetrate society to establish party representation at all levels of government and among various civic groups in Venezuelan society. The parties effectively met the needs of all classes, which was important for political support by the masses and for political leadership from the elites. There were other parties, but these two are the ones that would play a major role in Venezuelan political life.

<sup>28</sup> Linz and Stepan, 235.

<sup>29</sup> Wiarda and Kline, 237. The pact of Punto Fijo instituted a system of power sharing for every political entity except the Communist Party. The Pact would provide the democratic logic that allowed civilian rule to continue uninterrupted (but not without attempts to impose another form of government with force) until today.

<sup>30</sup> Deborah Norden, "Democracy and Military control in Venezuela," *Latin American Research Review* 33, no. 2 (1998): 148, 149. Norden applies Huntington's concept of objective and subjective control to explain how the Venezuelan civilian leadership attempted to exert civilian control over the armed forces. These measures were taken to prevent the armed force from taking matters into their own hands with regard to control of the state.

<sup>31</sup> Linz and Stepan, 99. There was a fear of a Cuban-inspired revolution erupting in Venezuela as a result of the reform policies of the radical Left in AD as well as other social-oriented political parties. Additionally, the government feared a right wing coup and purged old military leaders affiliated with the Jiménez regime.

<sup>32</sup> Loveman, 176.

<sup>33</sup> Norden, 150.

<sup>34</sup> Linz and Stepan, 102.

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<sup>35</sup> Wiarda and Kline, 237.

<sup>36</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, ed. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule - Latin America*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 212-213. These authors edited a number of books on the subject of military rule. They have discussed the concept of "bureaucratic-authoritarianism" and have provided a number of case studies for analysis.

<sup>37</sup> Wiarda and Kline, 238-240.

<sup>38</sup> *Background Notes - Venezuela*, Internet.

<sup>39</sup> Wiarda and Kline, 244. Chávez formed the "Boliviarian Military Movement" that had as its goal ending the corruption wrought by the political and business sectors. He appealed to the people that those who have committed crimes against the state through corruption and mismanagement should be tried in court. His message resonated among the very poor, who represented an ever-growing percentage of the Venezuelan population. He recognized this constituency and worked in the 1990s to break the system of power sharing through the ballot box.

<sup>40</sup> John Tierney. "Is Democracy Doomed in Venezuela?" *The Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum*. (no. 630, 22 October 1999); <http://www.heritage.org/library/execmemo/em630.html>; Internet, accessed February 8, 2000. Tierney assessed the affect of Chávez's rule on the long-term health of Venezuelan democracy, and offers advice on US policy towards Venezuela. He further defined "Boliviarian Messianism" as a mixture of romantic idealism, militarism, and socialism. Chávez is influenced by Bolívar with regard to the first two. He is influenced by the actions of Fidel Castro in his socialist views.

<sup>41</sup> Speech by President Hugo Chávez delivered at the Inter-American Defense College, Washington, DC (22 September 1999) Inter-American Defense Board News Page; <http://www.jid.org/newsframe.htm>; Internet, accessed 8 February 2000.

<sup>42</sup> Tierney, Internet.

<sup>43</sup> Speech by Chávez, Internet.

<sup>44</sup> Tierney, Internet

<sup>45</sup> "Barracks Growl" *The Economist*, 354, no. 8161 (11 March 2000), 42. Visconti led an air force coup in late 1992, some eight months after Chávez.

<sup>46</sup> Since Chávez's inauguration, he has dissolved the Congress through a referendum, rewritten the constitution through a pro-Chávez committee, changed the leadership in the state-run oil industry, and elevated former coup leaders to governmental positions.

<sup>47</sup> US Department of State, *Background Notes: Panama* (Washington: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, January 2000), Internet; [http://www.state.gov/www/background\\_notes/panama\\_0100\\_bgn.html](http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/panama_0100_bgn.html); accessed 18 February 2000

<sup>48</sup> Sandra W. Meditz and Dennis M Hanratty, ed. *Panama - a Country Study* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1989), 9.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 12. The ravaging of Panama City at the hand of buccaneer Henry Morgan from 1688 to 1670 resulted in the destruction of the city. The Spanish rebuild and fortified the city in 1672. What is important is that the pirates as well focused on this area because it afforded access between the two oceans.

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<sup>50</sup> David McCullough. *The Path Between the Seas - The Creation of the Panama Canal 1870-1914* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), 65, 204. The book traces the role of the French and the United States in the building of the Canal.

<sup>51</sup> David Howarth. *Panama - Four Hundred Years of Dreams and Cruelty* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966), 215-244. The intrigue involved Frenchman Philippe Bunau-Varilla, representing the business interest of the bankrupt French Canal company, businessman William Cromwell, Bunau-Varilla's contact in the US, President Theodore Roosevelt, who wanted a canal to enable the US aim of becoming a global sea power, the Panamanian independence movement led by Dr. Manuel Amador, who desired to leverage US interest in the canal project to achieve independence from Colombia in order to receive the most favorable financial terms. Panamanian declaration of independence, supported by the US Navy, led to Colombia's release of the region. The US signed the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty in 1903, granting the canal to the US "in perpetuity".

<sup>52</sup> Steve C. Ropp. *Panamanian Politics - from Guarded nation to National Guard*. (New York: Praeger Press, 1982), 15-16. The Establishment of the Canal Zone provided a US military, political, social, economic, and legal enclave that dominated the most important service in the country. While the Panamanian elite could not affect the administration of the canal, it could operate as a commercial oligarchy unrivaled by other groups in the country. The majority of the foreign influence resided in the Canal Zone.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>54</sup> Meditz and Hanratty, 220.

<sup>55</sup> Stephen H Baranyi, "The Dialectics of Military Development and Strategic Defeat in Panama" (Ph.D. diss., York University, Ontario Canada, 1993), 108.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 112. Unlike previous presidents, Remón used the Guard as a political base of support to promote a policy of social and economic reform. He used the government (including the Guard) to launch programs aimed at improving public health, education, taxes, as well as promoting agricultural development.

<sup>57</sup> *Background Notes - Panama*, Internet.

<sup>58</sup> Ropp, 37.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 37, 42-45. Torrijos rewrote the constitution in 1972, requiring government agencies to work "in harmonic collaboration" with the National Guard. The armed forces assumed a central role in all aspects of life in Panama. Torrijos directly commanded the seven infantry companies in the Guard and assigned all officer positions. The officers on the General Staff functioned as shadow government ministers, undermining the efforts of the civilians in place. Torrijos divided the country into ten military zones, and majors and captains acted as de facto provincial governors of their assigned zone. The Guard used their geographic location in poorer areas and their support of local sports to engender support by the poor.

<sup>60</sup> Meditz and Hanratty, 224.

<sup>61</sup> *Background Notes - Panama*, Internet

<sup>62</sup> Ropp, 113-114.

<sup>63</sup> Baranyi, 187.

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid., This is the first time in Panam's history that the military received such an unambiguous mandate. It specifically elevated the PDF as a coequal to the US with regard to responsibilities for the defense of the Canal and charged the PDF to protect the lives, honor, and property of foreigners under national jurisdiction. This challenged the exclusionary aspect of the Canal Zone, which remained under US control.

<sup>65</sup> "Gallery of Presidents", President of the Republic of Panama; <http://www.presidencia.gob.pa/portada.htm>; Internet, accessed 20 April 2000.

<sup>66</sup> Meditz and Hanratty, 189.

<sup>67</sup> Baranyi, 219.

<sup>68</sup> *Background Notes - Panama*, Internet.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. Once President Guillermo Endara took control, he disbanded the PDF and established a civilian "public force" subordinate to civilian rule..

<sup>70</sup> The US Southern Command Strategy of Cooperative Regional Peacetime Engagement lists "maintain Freedom of Access to Recognized International Waterways and Airways" as one of its strategic aims. Fundamental in the Panama Canal treaty is the bilateral agreement to maintain the neutrality of the Canal.

<sup>71</sup> G. Russell Evans. *Death Knell of the Panama Canal?* (Fairfax: National Security Center, 1999), 66. While not a particularly scholarly source, this book highlights the deep-seated fear among some in the US concerning the establishment of the Chinese company Hutchison Whampoa as one of the port operators in the Canal. What is important to note is the lack of US presence in the country makes it difficult to respond effectively to a situation the Panamanian government cannot handle.

<sup>72</sup> "Out be Panama's Front Door, in Through the Back?" *The Economist*, 10 January 1998; <http://www.economist.com/12y3m35n/archive/view.cgi>; Internet, accessed 20 April 2000. The Colombian FARC use the Darien as a rest and relaxation base. The Colombian right-wing paramilitary groups have invaded these areas, attacking villages where the FARC stayed, denounced the peasant villagers as rebel sympathizers, and killed them. Panamanians are frustrated because there is no force that can both prevent the FARC from using the area as a bivouac site, and protect the people against reprisals by Colombian vigilante groups.

<sup>73</sup> Juan Zamorano "War Drives Colombians to Panama" Associated Press, 24 April 2000; AOL: 04/24: War Drives Colombians to Panama; Internet service provider, accessed 24 April 2000.

<sup>74</sup> Lisa Adams. "Increase in Panama Drug Trafficking" Associated Press, 26 April 2000; AOL: 04/26: Increase in Panama Drug Trafficking; Internet service provider, accessed 26 April 2000.

<sup>75</sup> Nayra Delgado. "Panama Becomes Bazaar for Central American Weapons" Reuters news service, 17 April 2000; AOL 04/17: Panama Becomes Bazaar for Central American Weapons; Internet service provider, accessed 17 April 2000.

<sup>76</sup> Posture Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, United States Marine Corps Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 13 April 1999.

<sup>77</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3113.01 "Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Theater Engagement Plans", 1 April 1998; <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs>; Internet, accessed 20 April 2000. The document formalizes the requirement to create a TEP, and the review procedures for the TEP.

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<sup>78</sup> US Southern Command's Strategy of Cooperative Regional Peacetime Engagement 1998; CD ROM provided by LTC DeEtte Lombard, Department of Joint and Multinational Operations.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> USSOUTHCOM Theater Strategy and Strategic Planning, briefing provided to the author by SOUTHCOM J5, April 1999.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid. The TEP is a classified document, but many portions of the document is unclassified. The author will restrict comments to unclassified material only.

<sup>83</sup> USCINCSOUTH Theater Engagement Plan FY 2000. Emailed to the author by SOUTHCOM J5.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid. The document states that Venezuela alone provides the same amount of oil to the US than all the Persian Gulf states combined. This statement may not always be true. It is better to state that Venezuela consistently ranks in the top three oil exporters to the US. The other two are Mexico and Saudi Arabia.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> The author spent one year (1997-1998) in Caracas Venezuela, and attended the Venezuelan preparatory course for their version of CGSC. A number of my classmates had attended schools or received training in the US. Their planning framework was a mirror image of US doctrine, with some exceptions.

<sup>87</sup> Larry Rohter "Pullout from Panama and Venezuelan Reluctance Leave Gap in US Air War on Drugs" *New York Times*, 14 August 1999; <http://www.nytimes.com>; Internet, accessed 20 April 2000.

<sup>88</sup> Bradley Graham. "Venezuelan Stance Halts Pentagon's Flood Relief" *Washington Post*, 15 January 2000; <http://www.washingtonpost.com>; Internet, accessed 20 April 2000.

<sup>89</sup> The Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; <http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions/Venezuela/current.html>; Internet, accessed 18 April 2000. This is the rewritten constitution of 1999.

<sup>90</sup> Adams. The effect of the loss of Howard is that small aircraft could once again transit the airspace heading towards the US

<sup>91</sup> Interview with US COL Valentino, officer in J5 section 23 March 2000. He worked with the Panamanians on their NSS, as well as canal and border security issues. He stated that the only issue holding up SOUTHCOM engagement is that there is no Panamanian military. The Panamanian Police Force receives the majority of its training from US law enforcement agencies.

<sup>92</sup> Posture Statement. 23-24.

<sup>93</sup> US Southern Command's Presentation on the US Army School of Americas to Congress; <http://192.108.235.6/usarsa/main.htm>; Internet, accessed 20 April 2000.

<sup>94</sup> Theater Engagement Plan Information Paper. The paper outlines the requirements of the TEP, the planning cycle, and the issues involved with producing the document.

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<sup>95</sup> Interview with MAJ José Mata, an officer in SOUTCOM J5. He indicated that the greater issues result from long-standing societal issues, and that the TEP will have limited effect without complimentary support from the interagency.

<sup>96</sup> Theater Engagement Plan Initiatives Information Paper - Funding Shape Requirements. The paper was written to present the point that shaping activities funding need the same attention as responding and preparing funding. The newness of TEP has introduced a funding gap, and SOUTCOM has suggested a resolution to the problem.

<sup>97</sup> US Army School of Americas; <http://192.108.235.6/usarsa/main.htm>; Internet, accessed 23 April 2000. The SOA has undergone substantial changes designed to institutionalize instruction on human rights, civilian control of the military, the rule of law, and domestic support. Additionally, the SOA receives an annual review by a board of visitors (US diplomats, academics, and military). The website attempts to support the idea of transparency through the availability of congressional briefings, course catalogues, staff and faculty, students, and graduates.

<sup>98</sup> Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University; <http://www3.ndu.edu/chds/index.html>; Internet, accessed 18 February 2000. The institute was created as a result of the Defense Ministerial of the Americas in 1995. To date, 348 students from 33 different Latin American and Caribbean countries have graduated from the Washington, DC course.

<sup>99</sup> "Barracks Growls", 44. The article summarizes sentiments from former guerrilla leaders during the Chávez coup, as well as civilians that supported his efforts to overthrow the Pérez government. In 1992. The sentiment is that once the populist honeymoon subsides, Chávez will face new enemies he formed as a result of his authoritarian reforms in government.

<sup>100</sup> Posture Statement, 34.

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